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I N the beginning of the age of world commerce, cities could only
be great if they were port cities, for the vast oceans of water which
enfold our earth provided the early avenues of commerce - level high-
ways where vagrant winds propelled ships of trade to distant ports
in an ancient world. Occasionally a few landlocked cities at the cross-
roads of overland trade routes also thrived. When the airplane came
these landlocked cities suddenly found themselves, without plan, at
the floor of a new ocean -without Tennyson's vision they became
the beneficiaries of his dream: each could be a port of call for the
"pilots of the purple twilight, dropping down with costly bales."' The
ocean of air had always been there but it was of little use; now that
it provided new highways where giant ships would ply their way, the
race of competition compelled the city to prepare a port to bring
these vessels to dock. As early as 1928 bond issues for the development
of an airport were held to be a valid municipal purpose 2 and the
1 For I dipt into the future, far as human eye could see,
Saw the Vision of the world, and all the wonder that would be;
Saw the heavens fill with commerce, argosies of magic sails,
Pilots of the purple twilight, dropping down with costly bales;
Alfred Lord Tennyson, Locksley Hall (1842).
2 The acquisition and development of an airport is generally held to be a
"public purpose" or "municipal purpose" within the purview of a state constitution,
which permits the legislature to delegate to a city the power to incur an indebted-
ness for such a purpose. Dysart v. City of St. Louis, 321 Mo. 514, 11 S.W. 2d 1045
(1928). It is not a necessary expense, and the state constitution may require a vote
of the people before a debt may be incurred or taxes levied for the purpose; but
the municipal authority, once obtained, to maintain and operate the airport may be
confided to a municipal corporate authority created for that purpose by appropriate
legislative action. See Greensboro-High Point Airport Authority v. Johnson, 226
N.C. 1, 36 S.E. 2d 803 (1946).
For a general summary of early decisions in this field, see Rhyne, Airports
and the Courts (Washington 1944) pp. 20-48.
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city that did not prepare itself for the air age was likened to Chalcedon,
the city of the blind.8
In aviation's earlier years when aircraft were smaller in size and
fewer in number than today, airport sites were selected beyond the
city limits where land was cheap and man-made obstructions were
few. But with normal growth, augmented by wartime's stimulus and
the movement of people to the cities, urban areas reached out to sur-
round the airport. Similarly the burgeoning airport community merged
with the city's urban periphery.
Progress in the art of aviation has made possible larger and faster
airplanes of greater efficiency and economy. But since the basic design
of currently operating and near-future air transports has not changed
since the first powered flight at Kitty Hawk, the take-off and landing
speeds of the modern aircraft still are functions of its in-flight opera-
tional speeds. However with improvement of the aerodynamic qualities
of wings, of wing flaps and generally in the low-speed flying qualities
of aircraft, the rate of increase of airport operational speeds has been
held down. Thus, as the cruising speed of the aircraft increases, so too
at a diminishing rate do the take-off and landing speeds and the dis-
tance necessary to accommodate these maneuvers. Meanwhile aircraft
gross weights are steadily increasing.
Commercial application of aviation progress follows a certain
process: research development, military application and finally com-
mercial use. With aircraft and component aviation devices increasing
in complexity this process requires an ever increasing time lag; the
maturing process has ranged from approximately thirteen years in the
past to twenty years today. Charting scientific progress therefore, with
the lag in commercial application should afford us some idea of what
to expect in the future for the commercial air transport. Figures I
and II demonstrate this trend- both gross weights and airport opera-
tional speeds will continue to rise and will determine the paths the
air transport will follow in approaching and leaving an airport. As
the aircraft attains higher speed and greater weight its paths become
shallower and of greater radius; moreover the future trend will be
the same and as landing speeds increase to 120 to 130 miles per hour
the flight paths may be twenty to thirty per cent flatter than those in
the 100 mile per hour range- still approximately the landing speed
of today's commercial transports.
Thus the airport and its neighbors have been drawn closer together
and through such proximity have found themselves impinging upon
each other from the effect of three circumstances: (1) The urbaniza-
tion of areas immediately surrounding the airport boundary, (2) The
increase in frequency of air traffic and general intensification of all
3 "The city that is without the foresight to build the ports for the new traffic
may soon be left behind in the race of competition. Chaleedon was called the city
of the blind because its founders rejected the nobler site of Bysantium lying at
their feet .... The dweller within the gates even more than the stranger from
afar, will pay the price of blindness." Hess v. Rath, 249 N.Y. 436, 438, 164 N.E.
342 (1928).
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Maximum speeds and maximum weights go ever higher. As speeds and
weights go up, paths become flatter and turns have a greater radius. Noise
increases with power.
Statistics from Aircraft Year Book and American Aviation
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flight operations, (3) The alternation of approach flight paths to
a more shallow configuration as aircraft weights and speeds increase.
Hence scientific progress, population increase and economic growth
have caused a clash of interests between the landowner, either as an
individual or as a member of a community, and the airman, as he
approaches and leaves the airport serving that community. Through
the creation of noise, the blowing of dust, noxious gasses and fumes,
the glare of lights and the fear of an actual physical intrusion through
the violence of a plane falling out of control, he may invade the home
owner's privacy, disturb his peace and actually diminish the value
of his property.4 And although the problem stems from the basic con-
troversy between the sky-farer and the surface dweller, its branches
reach out to the field of intricate conflict between local and federal
government and indeed beyond, to the field of international relation-
ships. Furthermore our military air power could not exist without
a smooth functioning civil air arm since a nation's air power is not
dichotomous; its strength lies in its unity.
Recent air tragedies demonstrate the coextension of federal and
local problems in the control of this new activity utilizing an area
hitherto unattainable, hence unregulated. In Figure III a broken
landing gear fallen from the sky-lanes of world commerce looms on the
lawn of a dwelling; a twisted propeller menaces a modest home and
goes to the essence of our problem.
LAW OF LANDOWNER-AIRMAN RIGHTS
Airspace Ownership and Use
There existed in the ancient common law a maxim concerning
the rights of landowners - Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum
et ad inferos: "Whosoever has the soil, also owns to the heavens above
and to the centre beneath." With the advent of the aircraft, however,
it soon became apparent that this maxim was propounded as law
only when it could not be effectively breached. Farsighted jurists,
upon first consideration realized its sterility; there exists a case in
the English reports where, through fear of subjecting early aeronauts
to limitless trespass suits, a noted jurist refused to regard an over-
hanging board as a breaking of the close.5 Literal application of the
4 The Report of the President's Airport Commission, J. H. Doolittle, Chairman,
The Airport and Its Neighbors (Wash.: G.P.O., 1952) presents a thorough analysis
of this problem.
This report and a Law Note, op. cit. infra n. 39; Pogue and Bell, op. cit. infra
n. 17; Hunter, The Conflicting Interests of Aircraft Owner and Nearby Property
Owner, 11 Law & Contemp. Prob. 539 (1945-1946), and Rhyne, Federal, State and
Local Jurisdiction over Civil Aviation, ibid., p. 459, presented a thorough back-
ground for the preparation of this work. For a strong, early advocation of the
federal viewpoint see McDonald and Kuhn, The Ocean Air-State or Federal
Regulation, 31 Va. L. Rev. 363 (1945).
5 "Nay, if this board overhanging the plaintiff's garden be a trespass, it would
follow that an aeronaut is liable in an action of trespass quare clausum fregit at
the suit of the occupier of every field over which his balloon passes on the course
of his voyage." Lord Ellenborough in Pickering v. Rudd, 4 Camp. 219 220-221, 171
Eng. Rep. 70, 71 (1815).
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maxim can be found only in non-aviation cases providing small back-
ground for the greater interplay of social and economic forces later
to resolve the differences. Thus encroaching telephone wires, angrily
projecting one's arm, an overhanging flashboard, or tree, leaning
walls, and overhanging roof, projecting eaves and the shooting of
guns6 have all been regarded as invasions of the superincumbent air-
space - the exclusive realm of the landowner.
Jurists, generally, sensing the magnitude and divergence which the
forces exerted by the landowner and airman would assume have tried
to balance them in the public interest. They have pursued several
avenues of approach, resulting in different theories but arriving, usu-
ally, at a common goal. Moreover, the legal basis on which the ag-
grieved landowner has sought relief has sometimes been a factor in
fashioning the law. At times the remedy chosen was an action in tres-
pass into the airspace above the property owner's land by aircraft,
usually from an adjacent airport;7 more frequently an action alleging
a nuisance,8 when the airport's operation disquieted the landowner,
was entertained.
How were these discords resolved and upon their settlement, what
theories of airspace ownership were built? The most conservative
theory, the beginning of which may very well have been based upon
the ad coelum maxim holds that the landowner's title to airspace
above his land extends upward without limit, subject only to an ease-
ment or privilege of flight in the public. This concept is contained in
the Uniform Aeronautics Act, which was in effect in twenty-two states
in 1943 when the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ceased ad-
vocating its adoption,9 and in the Restatement of Torts.'0
The most general theory is based upon the premise that the land-
owner owns that airspace above his property which he is able to-
occupy or use in the enjoyment of his land." This is known as the
possible effective possession theory. There appears to be some con-
fusion here as to the import of this concept which may stem from the
6 Butler v. Frontier Telephone Co., 186 N.Y. 486, 79 N.E. 716 (1906) (tele-
phone wires) ; Hannabalson v. Sessions, 116 Iowa 457, 90 N.W. 93 (1902) (project-
ing arm); Puorto v. Chieppa, 78 Conn. 401, 62 Atl. 664 (1905) (overhanging
flashboard); Ackerman v. Ellis, 81 N.J.L. 1, 79 Atl. 883 (1911) (overhanging
trees); Barnes v. Berendes, 139 Cal. 32, 69 Pac. 491 (1902) (leaning Walls);
Murphy v. Bolger, 60 Vt. 723, 15 Atl. 365 (1888) (overhanging roof) ; Wilmarth
v. Woodcock, 58 Mich. 482, 25 N.W. 475 (1885) (projecting eaves); Herrin v.
Sutherland, 74 Mont. 587, 241 Pac. 328 (1925) (shooting guns).
7 Burnham v. Beverly, Inc., 311 Mass. 628, 42 N.E. 2d 575 (1942); Hinman v.
Pacific Air Transport, 84 F. 2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936); Smith v. New England
Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930). See also Brandes v. Mitterling,
67 Ariz. 349, 196 P. 2d 464 (1948).
8 Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817 (1934) ; Vanderslice v.
Shaun, 26 Del. Ch. 225, 27 A. 2d 87 (1942).
9 Uniform Aeronautics Act §§ 3, 4, 11 U.L.A. 159-167 (Supp. 1949).
10 Restatement, Torts § 194 (1934).
11 Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E. 2d 245 (1942); Cory v.
Physical Culture Hotel, 14 F. Supp. 977 (W.D. N.Y. 1936); Thrasher v. Atlanta,
178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817 (1934); Swetland v. Curtiss, 41 F. 2d 929 (N.D. Ohio
1930), modified 55 F. 2d 201 (6th Cir. 1931); Dutton v. Mendocino County, 1949
U.S. Av. R. 1 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1948); of. Gardner v. Allegheny, 382 Pa. 88, 114 A.
2d 491 (1955).
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word "possible" viewed in connection with time: some believing
that present title would vest in the landowner all that space which
he could possibly use for all time in the future but this would not
be reasonable yet when we combine reasonableness with future possi-
bility we move into the area of liklihood or probability making the
distinction meaningless. A holding that the landowner does own some
airspace would cause the nature of his action against the encroaching
airman to vary with the circumstance of the injury: trespass for an
obtrusion into airspace which is owned; nuisance for injury from acts
done outside the envelope of ownership.
The view expressed by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Causby 2-similar to state court holdings mentioned above-is that the
landowner owns at least as much of the airspace above his land as he
can occupy and use in connection therewith. Here the court held that
continued flights, the glare of lights and the deafening roar of heavy
army aircraft while passing but a few feet over the plaintiff's dwelling
on final approach to the field, caused fright to those living therein,
virtually destroyed the productive use of the land as a chicken farm
and thus constituted a taking of property. The court found reason
for its decision in an earlier non-aviation controversy, 13 where the
imposition of a servitude by the firing of heavy projectiles above the
property deprived the owner of profitable use and constituted a taking;
but it may well be that had the Causby case followed the passage of the
Federal Tort Claims Act,14 one of the more conventional avenues of
approach would have been traveled by the plaintiff. 5 The case was
remanded to the Court of Claims which determined an area of prob-
able possession-in view of the nature of the land and the use to which
it would likely be put, considering its location and surroundings16-
and designated that area as being owned by the subjacent landowner.
On the basis of this holding, some writers have chosen to find
another category of airspace ownership, that of probable effective posses-
sion as distinguished from possible effective possession; however this
12 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
13 Portsmouth Harbor Land and Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327, 43
S. Ct. 135 (1928).
14 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1952).
15 See Venneman, The Causby Case and the Relation of Landowners and
Aviators, 14 J. Air L. & Com. 112, 116 (1947).
16 Causby v. United States, 109 Ct. Cl. 768, 75 F. Supp. 262 (1948).
The court of Claims held that there was a "taking" up to 365 feet, which was
300 feet over the tallest object on plaintiff's property. The Court concluded:
"The result of this, we recognize, is to vest in the United States the right to
fly its airplanes at any altitude above 365 feet with impunity. This, of course,
would prevent the plaintiff's from erecting on their property a building of the
height of the Empire State Building or of any structure more than 365 feet in
height. Were this property located at a place where there was any likelihood that
such a structure would be erected on it, the defendant, without paying for it, would
have no right to the airspace above the property to an altitude so low as would
prevent such a structure from being erected. But here there was but the most
remote possibility that plaintiffs would ever put this property to such a use." 109
Ct. Cl., at 771, 75 F. Supp., at 264.
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is needlessly confounding a subject which is not yet clear with observ-
ers of air law"7 or settled by judicial decision. What is significant in
the Causby case is the remedy-for it was the remedy which moved the
theory of ownership as the basis for recovery out of the possible and
into the probable effective possession concept. An action in tort could
not be had. But the taking of an easement may be either temporary
or perpetual-beginning at a fixed time and terminating later, or
continuing endlessly. Wherefore the Court of Claims would be dis-
posed to assert actual use and probable future use for the purpose of
determining a property taking which could conceivably be fixed for
all future time.' 8 This view was taken in a recent eminent domain
case for an obstruction easement where a federal district court men-
tioned as a factor of depreciation the fact that the property could not
fully participate in future residential development. 19
On the other hand, cases which have been determinative of the
possible effective possession concept have usually been actions in tres-
pass and nuisance. Under this concept and the nature of the legal
actions determinative of it, what is not owned today may be owned
17 E.g., Venneman, supra, n. 15, at p. 114, says of the Causby case: "But here
now there is a judicially sanctioned formula. The Court says, 'The landowner owns
at least as much of the space above the ground as he can occupy and use in con-
nection with the land .... The fact that he does not occupy it in a physical sense-
by the erection of buildings and the like-is not material.' This has been known as
the possible effective possession theory as adopted by other courts in previous
cases ..."
Rhyne, in Airport Legislation and Court Decisions, 14 J. Air L. & Com. 289 at
295 (1947), lists five theories of airspace and rights:
"1. The landowner owns all the air space above his property without limit in
extent;
"2. the landowner owns the air space above his property to an unlimited extent,
subject to an 'easement' or 'privilege' of flight in the public;
"3. the landowner owns the air space up to such heights as is fixed by statute,
with flights under that height 'trespasses';
"4. the landowner owns the air space up as far as it is possible for him to take
effective possession but beyond the 'possible effective possession zone' there is no
ownership in air space; and
"5. the landowner owns only the air space he actually occupies and can only
object to such use of the air space over his property as does actual damage.
"... The fifth or 'actual use' theory has been adopted by the ... Supreme Court
of the United States in the Causby case."
Pogue and Bell in The Legal Framework of Airport Operations, 19 J. Air L.
& Com. 253 at 255-257 (1952) define the first three of the five airspace ownership
theories the same as Rhyne does, and then continue as follows:
"4. The landowner owns the air space up as far as it is possible for him to
take effective possession.
"5. The landowner owns the air space up as far as he actually occupies or of
which it is probable that he will ever take effective possession.
"The distinction between (4), which appears to have been followed by a number of
state courts and (5), which is the one pronounced by the Supreme Court in the
Causby case, is the difference between air space which could conceivably be used
if, for example, the landowner wanted to demolish his house and build another
(Empire State Building) or which he is actually using or probably ever will use.
These two theories are predominant today but there has been no final agreement
as to which is to be followed."
Undoubtedly the divergences in the above resulted from the Venneman and
Rhyne articles having appeared prior to the report of the Causby action in the
Court of Claims (supra, n. 16) advancing the "probable effective possession" theory.
18 Actually the easement was found to be temporary, 109 Ct. Cl. at 770, 75
F. Supp. at 263; however the idea of a continuum is inherent in the concept of a
taking.
19 United States v. 48.10 Acres of Land, 144 F. Supp. 258 (S.D. N.Y. 1956).
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tomorrow; whatever a landowner can effectively occupy he owns, plus
an additional area-ownership of a continuing envelope of atmosphere
surrounding whatever reasonable use to which the land may be put.
Actions thus brought (it is highly unlikely that an air easement could
be acquired by prescription 20), concern the then existing use of the
land and can, with much greater freedom and without affecting the
future possessory privilege of the plaintiff at bar, advance a theory of
ownership based on some idea of possible effective possession. The
significant contribution of the Causby case is its extension of the rem-
edies available to the landowner against obnoxious air activities; in
addition to actions in negligence, trespass, or nuisance he now has at
his avail, against the government at least, an action to recover for a
taking of property based on the prohibition in the fifth amendment
against the taking of ". private property ... for public use, without
just compensation."
Other significant decisions have helped to fashion the law. One
court has found the landowner without title to any airspace other than
that presently occupied or used. 21 Here the only legal right to property
was held to be dominion over it and only use by aircraft of the space
above, which in fact does actual or substantial damage resulting in
injury to the land or which interferes with possession or beneficial use
would be actionable as a trespass. Actions alleging nuisance would of
course still be available. Deemphasizing legal theories and recognizing
economic exigencies, a federal district court enjoined the 'further use
of an airport after weighing the losses suffered by both parties to
determine the one who had the least to lose monetarily.22 Using
statutory flight minimums fixed by state instrumentalities under the
police power and by Congress under the Commerce Clause to gauge
the scope of private rights, a Massachusetts court suggested a consider-
ation of the statutory rules in determining technical trespass; 23 a fed-
eral district Court in Ohio has held that an allegation of such a viola-
tion constitutes a case for negligence, 24 and one in Utah regarded
flights above the minimum safe altitude of flight prescribed by the
Civil Aeronautics Board as determinative of a zone where no negligence
can be imputed regardless of the surface damage caused.25 Hence the
20 At least without some refashioning of the law. See Hinman v. Pacific Air
Transport, 84 F. 2d 755, 759 (9th cir. 1936), cert. denied 300 U.S. 654 (1937)
where the court said, "We therefore hold that it is not legally possible for appellees
to obtain an easement by prescription, through the airspace above appellants'
land." Also see authorities cited therein.
But cf. Strother v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 94 Cal. App. 2d 525, 211 P.
2d 624 (1949), where the court found it unnecessary to determine whether pre-
scriptive rights to an airlane may have been acquired by adverse user when the
right of way was lost by the owner's beneficial construction and use without opposi-
tion for a period of more than five years.
21 Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F. 2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936), cert. denied
300 U.S. 654 (1937).
22 Swetland v. Curtiss, 41 F. 2d 929 (N.D. Ohio 1930).
23 Burnham v. Beverly Airways, 311 Mass. 628, 42 N.E. 2d 575 (1942). See
also Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930).
24 Neiswanger v. Goodyear, 35 F. 2d 761 (N.D. Ohio 1929).
25 Boskovich v. United States, 3 Av. Cas. 17,252 (U.S.D.C. Utah Cent. Div.
1950).
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following five theories of landowners' rights in airspace may be useful
to illustrate the basis on which these rights can be determined.
1. The "ad coelum" or "absolute ownership" theory-obsolete.
2. The "privilege of flight" theory-the landowner owns all air-
space above his property subject to a privilege of flight in the
public. This theory-becoming archaic-bears some relation-
ship to the "minimum safe altitude of flight" theory since early
statutes generally granted this right of flight through the sur-
face-owner's airspace.
3. The "envelope of air" theory-whatever space a landowner can
legally use above his land, plus an additional envelope of air
to insure the reasonable use and enjoyment of such occupancy,
becomes his whenever he uses it-the most popular theory.
4. The "minimum safe altitude of flight" theory where minimum
altitudes, propounded for safe navigation and the protection of
flight as well as surface activities, are used as some determinant
of liability or the extent of airspace ownership-has had some
currency.
5. The "ownership only to the extent of occupancy" theory-the
landowner owns only the airspace he actually occupies hence can
object only to such use of the airspace over his property as does
actual harm-varying from (3) mainly in the nature of the
action brought.
Air Passage and Surface Rights
A balance of equities is generally the legal tack taken by the courts
in resolving the conflicting claims between the airport operator and
the airman. As a general rule the case law in this area has recognized
the airplane as an integral part of modern life. Those who reside near
airports cannot be entirely free of the annoyances which may result,
but their enjoyment of surface property cannot be diminished inordi-
nately without compensation therefor. In a case where property owners
were denied an anticipatory injunction against the construction of an
airport to prevent forthcoming damages through noise, dust, crowds,
fright, depreciation of property values, and general annoyance, the
court expressed the conflict between the principle of free use of prop-
erty and the opposing principle that in such use the user must save
his neighbors from harm:
The law of nuisance plys between two antithetical extremes: the
principle that every person is entitled to use his property for any
purpose that he sees fit, and the opposing principle that everyone is
bound to use his property in such a manner as not to injure the
property or rights of his neighbor. For generations, courts, in
their tasks of judging, have ruled on these extremes according to
the wisdom of the day, and many have recognized that the con-
temporary view of public policy shifts from generation to genera-
tion.
In our business of judging in this case, while sitting as a court
of equity, we must not only weigh the conflict of interests between
the airport owner and the nearby landowners, but we must further
recognize the public policy of the generation in which we live. We
must recognize that the establishment of an airport of the kind
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contemplated is of great concern to the public, and if such an air-
port is abated, or its establishment prevented, the consequences will
be not only a serious injury to the owner of the port property but
may be a serious loss of a valuable asset to the entire community.
The necessities of a social state, especially in a great industrial
community, compel the rule that no one has absolute freedom in the
use of his property, because he must be restrained in his use by the
existence of equal rights in his neighbor to the use of his property.
This rule has sometimes been erroneously interpreted as a prohibi-
tion of all use of one's property which annoys or disturbs his neigh-
bor in the enjoyment of his property. The question for decision is
not simply whether the neighbor is annoyed or disturbed, but is
whether there is an injury to a legal right of the neighbor. The law
of private nuisance is a law of degree; it generally turns on the
factual question whether the use to which the property is put is a
reasonable use under the circumstances, and whether there is "an
appreciable, substantial, tangible injury resulting in actual, mate-
rial, physical discomfort, and not merely a tendency to injure. It
must be real and not fanciful or imaginary, or such as results
merely in a trifling annoyance, inconvenience or discomfort."
* *g *g *l *
All systems of jurisprudence recognize the requirement of com-
promise in the social state. Members of society must submit to
annoyances consequent upon the reasonable use of property. Sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas [use your own rights so that you
do not hurt those of another] is an old maxim which has a broad
application. If such rule were held to mean that one must never
use his own property in such a way as to do any injury to his
neighbor or his property, it could not be enforced in civilized
society. People who live in organized communities must of neces-
sity suffer some damage, inconvenience and annoyance from their
neighbors. For these annoyances, inconveniences and damages,
they are generally compensated by the advantages incident to living
in a civilized state.2 6
A city's airport may be a public utility, yet an airport can become
a nuisance through the circumstance of its construction, location or
operation.27 The most frequent complaints of aggrieved landowners
are directed against the noise of aircraft during the effort of run-up,
take-off and climb-out, the fright caused by their low flying and the
dust and fumes they cast upon the land. The airport operator, relying
on an implicit balance of benefits concept whereby he can usually
outweigh the scale, claims that the operation of his enterprise is in the
public interest and far exceeds the inconveniences suffered by adjacent
residents. 2 8 Although continual low altitude flights which may endan-
ger the life or affect the health of the surface dweller or unreasonably
disquiet him are actionable wrongs,29 the mere fear of harm from
26 Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio App. 465, 475-6, 477, 78 N.E. 2d 752,
759-60 (1947).
27 See Pogue and Bell, op. cit. supra n. 17, at 257-8.
28 Id. at 258. For a thorough analysis of the conflicting claims between airport
operations and property owners until 1944, see Rhyne, Airports and the Courts,
(Washington 1944).
29 Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E. 2d 245 (1942) ; Vanderslice
v. Shaun, 26 Del. Ch. 225, 27 A. 2d 87 (1942). See also Hinman v. Pacific Air
Transport, 84 F. 2d 755, cert. denied 300 U.S. 654 (9th Cir. 1936).
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aerial activity is not sufficient to authorize an injunction against flights
over the property of proximate home owners.30 One state court has
held that it may enjoin flights even in interstate commerce when con-
ducted below the minimum safe altitude of flight as during take-offs
and landings if they constitute a real danger to the life or property
of the landowner and there is no showing that the paths flown are
reasonably necessary for safe take-offs and landings or that an injunc-
tion will burden interstate commerce.81
Conversely the courts have increasingly recognized the public inter-
est involved in an airport's operation;3 2 whereas in earlier days airport
activities were sometimes permanently enjoined as a nuisance,88 more
recently injunctions requiring minimum altitudes during take-offs
and landings are even becoming less common and greater severity of
the causes necessary for the issuance of such injunctions must be
shown.3 4 In suits by airports against landowners which hamper airport
operation, the courts have shown little patience with devices purposely
erected to obstruct flight operations such as tall poles or useless towers.
But where a construction fulfills a useful purpose upon the land yet
obstructs the flow of airport traffic, the chance of prevailing against it
seems to turn upon the extent to which the airport participates in
interstate commerce and the timeliness of the objection. Lack of public
purpose or diligence in objecting favor the landowner and where the
construction is reasonable, legal and useful, yet obstructive, removal
will require condemnation by eminent domain.3 5
80 Batcheller v. Commonwealth ex rel. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Virginia,
176 Va. 109, 10 S.E. 2d 529 (1940); Thrasher v. Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E.
817 (1934).
31 Gardner v. Allegheny County, 382 Pa. 88, 114 A. 2d 491 (1955).
82 See Kuntz v. Werner Flying Service, 257 Wis. 405, 43 N.W. 2d 476 (1950);
Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio App. 465, 78 N.E. 2d 752 (1947).
83 See Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F. 2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932) ; Gay v.
Taylor, 1934 U.S. Av. R. 146 (Ct. of Com. P1. Pa. 1932).
34 Pogue and Bell, op. cit. supra n. 17, at 259.
35 See Roosevelt Field v. Town of North Hempstead, 88 F. Supp. 177 (D.C.
N.Y. 1950).
However, the effective length of an airport's runways could be diminished or
made useless by obstacles in the vicinity of an airport.
"Land usage control of the first half mile from either end of a runway is the
absolute minimum to assure the proper control of flight obstructions. In fact, such
control outwardly for 2 miles is extremely desirable. The problem of proper zoning
around airports must be faced in order to insure investment, minimize encroach-
ment of residential areas, and eliminate flight obstructions." S. Doc. No. 95, The
National Airport Program, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (Wash.: G.P.O., 1954) p. 28.
There is no reason why obstructions to an airport's use cannot be controlled
by a state's instrumentality through the zoning power just as land use may be
restricted generally for community benefit. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926). Yet the practice, though grounded in basic zoning principles,
is relatively new and as late as 1945 a city ordinance which undertook to zone for
an airport without the authority of a specific enabling statute, and which con-
stituted a taking of private property without due process of law, was set aside.
Yara Engineering Corporation v. City of Newark, 132 N.J.L. 370, 40 A. 2d 559
(1945).
Nevertheless, as navigation by air becomes more common, curtailment of the
free use of airspace by surface devices even for a sanctioned public purpose such
as a public utility's transmission lines has been held. In Yoffee v. Pennsylvania
Power and Light Co., 385 Pa. 520, 123 A. 2d 636 (1956), a public utility whose
wires were permissibly strung across a river in such an inconspicuous manner as
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The power to zone and of eminent domain are a concomitant of
the police power and may generally be exercised by local governments
when property must be regulated or taken for a municipal purpose
such as an airport. With the federal government these powers could
be found to hinge upon the Commerce Clause, the postal or war
powers;80 but doubt exists whether under present legislation, Congress
intended fully to assume these powers, particularly that of zoning or
that of exercising eminent domain for air easements where the airport
is not federally owned and operated. 7 Where eminent domain has been
exercised by the federal government the path of the condemnee is
sometimes a thorny one; it is not clear whether recovery of damages
for the taking of the air easement and consequent reduction in value
to the remainder may be combined with compensation for a diminu-
to cause a hazard, was found responsible for the death of an aviator who collided
with them at an altitude of 175 feet above the surface of the water. Stating that
with small cost, when weighed against human life, the wires could have been
marked conspicuously, the negilgence of this omission made the owner of the in-
stallation as responsible as if "he had shot down the aircraft." In dictum the court
stated that even had the utility company " . . . hung its wires over land to which
it had a free simple title it still could not be indifferent to legitimate air traffic
passing over it .... " contra the holding in an earlier California case where those
flying in a plane which struck an electric company's wires strung across its own
property were held to be trespassers to whom was owed no duty to warn of the
presence of the wires. Strother v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 94 Cal. App. 2d 525,
211 P. 2d 624 (1949).
But when the zoning power is delegated to the local government, the state
may still assert its sovereign power over the delegated power, as in Davidson
County, Tennessee v. Harmon, 292 S.W. 2d 777 (1956) where the state held itself
immune from injunctive relief against its exercise of a governmental function-
the construction of a mental health institution in the approach zone to a runway
of a county airport higher than that permitted by the county's zoning ordinance.
Here the assertion of sovereign immunity against an injunction aimed to enforce
local aviation-safety regulatory power demonstrates the danger of a downward
delegation of such power. A sovereign, for the sake of essential uniformity in air
commerce, should never wilfully distort the flow of commerce which its delegated
power seeks to accomplish, nor should the sovereigns be "multiple." A state in
weighing the care of its mentally ill charges against the flow of air commerce, may
strike a different balance from the federal government where alone the real need
for the development of the inseparable functions of air commerce and national
defense can best be realized.
By setting such needs in their proper place in the federal scheme, certainly
fewer compromises of air safety would be made, especially when we combine this
purpose with the sovereign power of Congress through legislation directly, or
through an agency, to condemn property owned by a municipality and already
devoted to a public use, when such property is needed to facilitate interstate com-
merce such as for the regulation of the use of navigable streams, including the
erection of dams therein and bridges thereover. City of Davenport v. Three-Fifths
of an Acre of Land, 147 Fed. Supp. 794 (D.C.S.D. Ill., 1957). Hence with the
activation of the dormant power of the federal government to zone airport ap-
proaches to maintain the free flow of interstate commerce (see note 87 infra)
would go the same characteristics which attend the power that the federal govern-
ment exercises over the states in eminent domain-a power which is plenary,
supreme and exclusive-guaranteeing the uniformity essential to air safety.
36 Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875) ; Jasper v. Sawyer, 100 F. Supp.
421 (D.D.C. 1951). See Seago and Armour, Federal Licensing of Airports, 22 J.
Air L. & Com. 51, 61 (1955).
37 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, section 302 (c), (2) 52 Stat. 985, as amended
by 62 Stat. 1216 (1948), gives the Administrator power to acquire by condemnation
real property or interests therein.
On zoning, see Pogue and Bell, op. cit. supra n. 17 at 264-268.
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tion in the value of the remaining property caused by anticipated air
traffic, or indeed whether recovery for the latter loss can be had at all.5 s
Civil Aeronautics and Federal Control
Today the exercise of federal control over aviation through the
commerce clause, as a means of navigation in interstate commerce
seems obvious yet prior to the enactment of the Air Commerce Act
of 1926 when aviation as a means of commerce was not so firmly fixed,
there was some worry as to the constitutionality of any exercise of
federal control in this field. Consequently at least three delegations
of our Constitution in addition to the commerce clause have been
advanced as a basis upon which the federal control of aviation may
rest-the admiralty jurisdiction, the war clause and the treaty power. 40
It is the commerce clause however which is most generally assumed
to form the basis of federal control of aviation. Since 1824,'41 when the
Supreme Court first pronounced upon the scope of national authority
and the limitations upon the states implied in the power conferred
upon Congress "to regulate Commerce with the foreign Nations and
among the several States," 42 it has been settled law that commercial
intercourse embracing, as time went on, electronic communication in
all of its forms, is an element of commerce which fell within the regulat-
ing power of Congress. Moreover commerce includes navigation;43
hence since the control of commerce has been held to extend to those
navigable waters which "form a continuous channel for commerce
among the States or with foreign countries, ' 44 it has been suggested
that the "continuous channel" test may be applied equally well to
aviation, giving Congress complete control over the airspace medium.
4 5
And a comprehension of the ubiquity of the air ocean leads to a clear
conclusion that, ".. . air as an element in which to navigate is even
more inevitably federalized by the commerce clause than is navigable
water."
46
In 1926 the first comprehensive federal code for the regulation of
air navigation was enacted. 47 The power to regulate aircraft registra-
38 Compare United States v. 4.43 Acres of Land, 137 F. Supp. 567 (N.D. Tex.
1956) with United States v. 48.10 Acres of Land, 144 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
See proviso, section 302 (c) of Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938; 52 Stat. 985, as
amended, 49 U.S.C. 452 (1952). See also, Buller, "Eminent Domain-Valuation
in Partial-Taking Cases," 24 J. Air L. & Com. 103 (1957).
30 See Note, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 169 at 172 (1954).
40 See Bogert, Problems in Aviation Law, 6 Cornell L. Q. 271 (1921). On the
idea that the federal government assumed such power through the ratification of
the Pan-American Convention, see Wigmore, Did the Federal Government Acquire
Exclusive Aerial Jurisdiction Two Years Ago? 4 Journ. of Air Law 232 (1933);
McCormack, Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction Over Aviation Via International
Treaties, 6 Air Law Review 13 (1935).
41 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
42 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
43 Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865).
44 Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 682 (1882).
45 See Note, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 169 at 173 (1954).
46 Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (concurring).
47 Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 568, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 171,
174-177, 179-184 (1952).
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tion and airworthiness, airman certification, navigational facilities, air
traffic rules and the suspension of certificates was conferred upon the
Secretary of Commerce. 48
The need for consolidation in the federal control of aeronautics
gathered momentum in the nineteen-thirties: as the industry grew,
regulation of the airlines, scattered among the Department of Com-
merce for safety, the Post Office Department for airmail contracts and
the Interstate Commerce Commission for rate fixing in the carriage of
mail called for unification. The debacle of the government's air mail
contract cancellation in 1934, followed by the disastrous attempt by the
Army to fly the mails and a growing need for the regulation of air
carrier services and rates, led in 1938 to union under on federal statute
and agency of both the economic and safety control of civil aviation. 49
The legislative intent of Congress in conferring regulatory powers of
broad scope is expressed in the Civil Aeronautics Act's declaration of
policy:
In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties under
this Act, the Authority shall consider the following, among other
things, as being in the public interest, and in accordance with the
public convenience and necessity-
(a) The encouragement and development of an air-transporta-
tion system properly adapted to the present and future needs of the
foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal
Service, and of the national defense;
(b) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to
recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the high-
est degree of safety in, and foster sound economic conditions in,
such transportation, and to improve the relations between, and coor-
dinate transportation by, air carriers;
(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service
by air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discrimina-
tions, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive
competitive practices;
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound
development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to
the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United
States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(e) The regulation of air commerce in such manner as to best
promote its development and safety; and
(f) The encouragement and development of civil aeronautics.50
A further illustration of the breadth of scope which Congress con-
templated in the Civil Aeronautics Act is found in the act's definition
of air commerce:
"Air commerce" means interstate, overseas, or foreign air com-
merce or the transportation of mail by aircraft or any operation or
navigation of aircraft within the limits of any civil airway or any
48 44 Stat. 569, 49 U.S.C. § 173 (repealed). Similar provisions are now in 52
Stat. 1005-1012 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §§ 521-523, 551-560 (1952).
49 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 977, as amended, 49 U.S.C.A. §§
401-705 (Supp. 1956).5052 Stat. 980 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 402 (1952).
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operation or navigation of aircraft which directly affects, or which
may endanger safety in, interstate, overseas, or foreign air com-
merce.51
The chief function of the regulatory power conferred upon the
Civil Aeronautics Authority is the control of safety; the keystone of a
successful civil air arm. Full control over the production and use of
aircraft from drawing board and flight performance to overhaul and
obsolescence, the margin of reserves from aircraft parts to flight fuel
minima, the maximum pilot hours, minimum safe altitudes of flight,
and air traffic rules are all enumerated in the act and are followed by a
residuary clause leaving to one legatee, the Civil Aeronautics Board,
plenary safety control.52 It is now settled law that the Civil Aeronautics
Authority has complete control over safety regulation of air commerce
in both interstate and intrastate activities. A reading of the definition
of air commerce to which all safety measures pertain illustrates the
broad sweep of the act and why, with little difficulty, the courts have
concluded that "affecting commerce" embraces all areas in which this
fast-moving activity could operate. The network of civil airways con-
necting control areas and zones at terminal points was already vast
during the period of low frequency four-course range navigation; now
with the omni-range system our land is a basket-weave of airways mak-
ing all flight activity-no matter how local-a possible hazard to inter-
state commerce and thus within the act's compass. Furthermore, in
reserving this field of aviation for federal regulation, no new legal
furrows had to be ploughed by the courts; for ample precedent was at
hand from railroad and water navigation cases holding that wherever
the interstate and intrastate transactions of carriers are so related that
the regulation of one involves the control of the other, it is Congress
and not the state which is entitled to prescribe the dominant rule. If
this were not true, the nation would lose its supremacy even in the
national field.58 As the searching wind diffuses the smallest substances
into the running streams of the ocean air, so does the most isolated
flight affect the main stream of air commerce. The Civil Aeronautics
Board knew this when it required certification for all aircraft and all
airmen for flights of any kind, anywhere in the United States, and
when the courts confirmed its scope not only to encompass intrastate
flights on civil airways 54 but off airways as well,55 they made the
Board's control of flight-safety universal in the ocean air above our land.
This judicial favor of national control has sustained the supremacy
5152 Stat. 977 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 401 (3) (1952).
5252 Stat. 1007 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 551 (a) (1), (3) (1952).
58 Houston and Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 351-352 (1913).
54 Rosenhan v. United States, 131 F. 2d 932 (10th Cir. 1942), cert. denied 318
U.S. 790 (1943).
55 Although Congress has established extensive federal control over all aircraft
and all airmen, United States v. Drumm, 55 F. Supp. 151 (1944), there remains
some doubt as to whether it intended, under present legislation, to assume full
control of safety at, near, or in airports, Seago and Armour, Federal Licensing of
Airports, 22 J. Air L. & Com. 51, 52-53 (1955). Also see Strother v. Pacific Gas and
Electric Co., 94 Cal. App. 2d 525, 211 P. 2d 624 (1949).
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of federal recordation statutes over those of the individual states; an
aircraft owner has been held to be exempt from the registration
requirement under the state statute when he had already complied
with the registration provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act; 56 and
the attempted assertion of a lien under a state recordation statute
governing a chattel mortgage of aircraft will fail before one recorded
federally.5 7 The trend toward federal regulation of air safety and its
affirmance by judicial interpretation of the Civil Aeronautics Act was
recognized by the removal, in 1943, of four of the Uniform State Acts
regulating various aspects of aeronautics from the active list of uniform
acts: The Uniform Aeronautics Act of 1922, the Uniform Air Licens-
ing Act of 1930, the' Uniform Aeronautical Regulatory Act of 1935,
and the Uniform Airports Act of 1935.1s
On state-federal conflict in railroad cases, the same rule appears to
apply to both economic and safety regulation. Here the Commerce
Clause has been held to mean that whenever interstate trade is bur-
dened or impeded by local government regulation, such impediment
must fall by the force of federal supremacy. Thus Congress has the
power to control intrastate charges of an interstate rail carrier to the
extent necessary to prevent injurious discrimination against interstate
commerce; 59 and to protect persons and property moving in interstate
commerce from all danger from whatever source, thereby requiring all
intrastate railroad traffic moving on highways of interstate commerce
to be so equipped as to avoid danger to persons and property moving
in interstate commerce.6 0
The same uniformity of attitude toward control does not exist in
air commerce, however. In a case of first impression a federal District
Court found that an air carrier which operates between points entirely
within a state is an intrastate carrier even though it carries persons
whose journeys originate or terminate outside the borders of the state.
Consequently the air carrier's economic regulation was held to be
within the jurisdiction of the state and not of the Civil Aeronautics
Board. The court inferred, in arriving at its decision, a difference in
scope between the definitions of air commerce and air transportation
in the Civil Aeronautics Act. The former, applicable to safety regula-
tions, is extremely broad in scope and includes activities which "affect"
interstate air commerce; the latter, applicable to economic regulation,
is defined as meaning "interstate, overseas, or foreign air transporta-
tion" with no mention made of activities which affect such transpor-
tation. Congress could have explicitly included such transportation;
since it failed to do so, the court held, the Civil Aeronautics Board
56 Salem Air Service v. Devaney, 2 Av. Cas. 14,432, 1947 U.S. Av. R. 629
(Oregon Cir. Ct. 1947).
57 In re Veterans Express Co., 76 F. Supp. 684 (D.N.J. 1948).
5s 1955 Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws 297. The acts are still in force in several states, however. See Id. 299.
59 Houston and Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1913); Wisconsin
Railroad Comm. v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 257 U.S. 563 (1922).
60 Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911).
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cannot achieve, by judicial interpretation, that which could easily have
been accomplished by explicit legislation."
Litigation in both state and federal courts concerning the power of
the Public Utilities Commission of California to regulate intrastate
fares of interstate carriers has been inconclusive, yet has left the control
of such fares under the state commission. In Western Airlines v. Cali-
fornia,62 an appeal to the United States Supreme Court from a holding
by the California Supreme Court that the Civil Aeronautics Act did
not pre-empt the field of economic regulation and that the Public
Utilities Commission of California had jurisdiction to regulate fares
in intrastate air transportation, but without considering whether Con-
gress had constitutional power so to do, was dismissed per curiam "for
want of a substantial federal question." There is some indication,
then, that the economic regulation of the intrastate activities of inter-
state air carriers may be reserved for the states. This may appear as a
loss of ground for plenary federal control, yet the above cases do not
settle the constitutional question; rather they are an interpretation of
the area of control which Congress intended to occupy through legis-
lation and not determinative of its full scope were it to change the
present legislation.
Airspace Sovereignty
About fifty years ago, coevally with the air age, was born the con-
cept of a nation's sovereignty in its overlying atmosphere. It sprang
from a rule of necessity, for although it could not then have been
certain that whosoever rules the air can subdue the land, it soon did
appear that complete territorial dominion required control of this
third dimension of travel. The necessity to conclude bilateral execu-
tive agreements, or any agreement or treaty with foreign nations
concerning the exchange of privileges in air navigation or commerce,
springs from the rule of air sovereignty, now a fixed principle of
international law. In earlier years, a country always exercised sover-
eignty over its land and territorial waters; now it embraces the over-
lying airspace as well. Thus each state not only controls the privilege
of foreign aircraft to land and trade within its borders, but to over-fly
as well-a right which it particularly and jealously safeguards.
The validity of sovereignty in airspace was conclusively set down
at the Paris Convention of 1919. It was again declared in the Ibero-
American Congress of 1926 and the Havana Convention of 1928.
Great Britain reasserted it in its Air Navigation Act of 1920, the United
States did so in its Aviation Acts of 1926 and 1938, and the Soviet
61 Civil Aeronautics Board v. Friedkin Aeronautics, Inc., 4 CCH Av. L. R.
17,457 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 1954).
62 People v. Western Airlines, 42 Cal. 2d 621, 268 P. 2d 723 (1954) appeal
dismissed per curiam, 348 U.S. 859 (1954). Where the federal district court
enjoined the PUC of California from interfering in any way with Unitei Air Line
fares between Long Beach and Catalina, on direct appeal the Supreme Court
reversed, per curiam, on procedural grounds, Public Utilities Commission of Cali-
fornia v. United Air Lines, 109 F. Supp. 13 (N.D. Cal. 1952) ; 346 U.S. 402 (1953).
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Union did so in its Air Code of 1932.63 Once decided among concur-
ring nations, airspace sovereignty was never challenged. Indeed at the
International Civil Aviation Conference at Chicago in 1944 it was
reiterated, making the "Five Freedoms" concept more alliterative than
precise, for the convention began not with a recognition of the right
to fly as an international commitment but rather with an assertion by
the contracting states that each has complete and exclusive sovereignty
over the airspace above its territory. It then contained a multilateral
grant of privileges in such sovereign airspace but never asserted rights
antagonistic to airspace sovereignty.64
The Air Commerce Act of 1926 proclaimed exclusive national
sovereignty when it declared:
FOREIGN AIRCRAFT-The Congress hereby declares that the
Government of the United States has, to the exclusion of all foreign
nations, complete sovereignty of the airspace over the lands and
waters of the United States, including the Canal Zone.... 65
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 amended this pronouncement by
striking "foreign nations" from the definition and changing the term
'sovereignty" to "national sovereignty":
FOREIGN AIRCRAFT-The United States of America is here-
by declared to possess and exercise complete and exclusive national
sovereignty in the air space above the United States, including the
air space above all inland waters and the air space above those por-
tions of the adjacent marginal high seas, bays, and lakes over which
by international law or treaty or convention the United States exer-
cises national jurisdiction.... 66
In defining navigable airspace the Air Commerce Act provided:
NAVIGABLE AIRSPACE-As used in this Act, the term
"navigable airspace" means airspace above the minimum safe alti-
tudes of flight prescribed by the Secretary of Commerce under
Section 3, and such navigable airspace shall be subject to a public
right of freedom of interstate and foreign air navigation in con-
formity with the requirements of this Act.67
This definition was later modified by the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938 only to the extent of investing the Civil Aeronautics Authority,
in place of the Secretary of Commerce, with the duty of determining
minimum safe altitudes of flight.68 Concerning public right of transit,
the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 reads as follows:
63 For early expressions of sovereignty in treaties and legislative acts see
Colegrove, International Control of Aviation (Boston 1930); I. S. Pereterski, The
Air Code of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 4 Air L. Rev. 153 (1933);
Hotchkiss, Aviation Law (New York 1938); Shawcross and Beaumont, Air Law
(1 ed. London 1945).
64 Chicago (ICAO) Convention, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591.
65 Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 572, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 176(a)
(1952).
66 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1028, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 176(a)
(1952).
67 Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 574, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 180 (1952).
68 52 Stat. 1028, 49 U.S.C. § 180 (1952).
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There is hereby recognized and declared to exist in behalf of
any citizen of the United States a public right of freedom of
transit in air commerce through the navigable air space of the
United States.69
These pronouncements have led to a great deal of confusion be-
tween "internal" and "external" sovereignty.7 0 Some believe that the
declaration of sovereignty pertains only to the relation of this nation
to other nations of the world in respect to the international use of the
airspace over the United States and its territories. Others believe that
these legislative declarations taken together evidence an intent by the
federal government to control all of the airspace of the United States
to the exclusion of the states. If the declaration of air sovereignty is
viewed from the international aspect, there remains the question of
whether the particular state retains dominion over its airspace for
regulatory and police powers. From the conclusion that the super-
jacent air is within the state's domain, it would follow that the state's
governing power extends to its airspace in the same manner as it
extends to the surface areas-lands and waters-and the general cleavage
of federal-state powers would inhere. Then federal control of all
activities in the airspace would be determined by the extent of its
constitutional powers in other spheres and the commerce clause would
determine its power to regulate commerce "with foreign nations and
among the several states" here as in other areas. This, then, would
limit Congress in its regulation of airspace activities to the extent of
the power reposed in the federal government through the commerce
clause, the general welfare clause and the war and postal powers. This
appears to be the dominant concept and has provided the basis for
prominent decisions in the field. In Braniff Airways v. Nebraska
Board71 the court stated:
The provision pertinent to sovereignty over the navigable air
space in the Air Commerce Act of 1926 was an assertion of exclu-
sive national sovereignty .... The Act, however, did not expressly
exclude the sovereign powers of the states. . . . The Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1938 gives no support to a different view. After the
enactment of the Air Commerce Act, more than twenty states
adopted the Uniform Aeronautics Act. It had three provisions
indicating that the states did not consider their sovereignty affected
by the National Act except to the extent that the states had ceded
that sovereignty by constitutional grant. The recommendation of
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
to the states to enact this Act was withdrawn in 1943. Where
adopted, however, it continues in effect. . . . Recognizing this
''exclusive national sovereignty" and right of freedom in air transit,
this Court in United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261, neverthe-
69 52 Stat. 980, 49 U.S.C. § 403 (1952).
70 See Cooper, State Sovereignty v. Federal Sovereignty of Navigable Airspace,
15 J. Air L. & Com. 27 (1948); Dinu, State Sovereignty in the Navigable Airspace,
17 J. Air L. & Com. 43 (1950).
71 Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska Board of Equalization and Assessment,
347 U.S. 590, 595-596 (1954) (emphasis added).
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less held that the owner of land might recover for a taking by
national use of navigable air space, resulting in destruction in
whole or in part of the usefulness of the land property.
These Federal Acts regulating air commerce are bottomed on
the commerce power of Congress, not on national ownership of
the navigable air space, as distinguished from sovereignty ...
The idea that a considerable area of jurisdiction and control of airspace
is left to the states was well expressed in 1930 by Chief Justice Rugg
of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts:
It is essential to the safety of sovereign States that they possess
jurisdiction to control the airspace above their territories. It seems
to us to rest on the obvious practical necessity of self-protection.
Every government completely sovereign in character must possess
power to prevent from entering its confines those whom it deter-
mines to be undesirable. That power extends to the exclusion from
the air of all hostile persons or demonstrations, and to the regula-
tion of passage through the air of all persons in the interests of the
public welfare and the safety of those on the face of the earth.
This jurisdiction was vested in this Commonwealth when it became
a sovereign State on its separation from Great Britain. So far as
concerns interstate commerce, postal service and some other mat-
ters, jurisdiction over the regulation of passage through the air in
large part was surrendered to the United States by the adoption
of the Federal Constitution .... 72
Adherents to this concept point out that in the adoption of the
Air Commerce Act of 1926 no attempt was made to fix the extent of
state sovereignty in airspace. This view finds substantiation in the
comments of the House Committee on the act's declaration of sover-
eignty,73 as well as in a provision in the act recognizing the rights of
states to establish airspace reservations. 74 It has been forcefully argued
that no state has the right to acquire new "territory" or to extend its
boundaries and, as a matter of fact, the adherents to state sovereignty
in air do not so claim. The structure of this concept rests on the idea
that the original Colonies gained sovereignty over the airspace as part
of their original territory upon winning freedom from the mother
country even though practical and effective control of the airspace was
yet a sesqui-century away. This would raise the question of when a
state acquired sovereignty in its then yet unattainable airspace, and
for this a thin thread is traced to ancient Rome when, at that early age,
surface owners' rights in usable airspace were given sovereign protec-
72 Smith v. New England Aircraft, 270 Mass. 511. 521, 170 N.E. 385, 389
(1930). See also Erickson v. King, 218 Minn. 98, 15 N.W. 2d 201 (1944).
73 Commenting on the Air Commerce Act's declaration of sovereignty, the
House Committee stated:
The Section in nowise affects the apportionment of sovereignty as between the
several States and the United States, but only as between the United States and
the rest of the world. Insofar as the States had sovereignty in the airspace at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution and such sovereignty was not by that
instrument delegated to the Federal Government, and insofar as the States may
have subsequently acquired sovereignty in airspace in accordance with the Con-
stitution, such sovereignty remains unchanged. Legislative History of the Air
Commerce Act of 1926, (Wash.: G.P.O., 1943) p. 38.
74 Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 570, 49 U.S.C. § 174 (1952).
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tion. Combining this with the will of a state to exercise its sovereignty
over any unattainable land regions which may be contained within its
borders such as dense jungles and the forbidding heights of mountains
fortifies the historical approach. By contrast, the "new territory" school
is grounded on control as a sine qua non of national sovereignty; the
mastery of the air was necessary before it could be added to a nation's
territorial domain just as the scepter of rulership was held above newly
acquired land.7 5
Two recent Supreme Court decisions, when read together, have
caused some disquietude among advocates of the state sovereignty con-
cept. In the Causby case 76 the Supreme Court divides the airspace into
two areas-an upper, or "navigable airspace" stratum and a lower or
surface dweller's envelope of air. Prefaced with the reminder that
Congress has declared the navigable air to be a public highway, the
court states that the upper stratum has been placed by Congress in the
public domain. Significantly absent from this case is dependence upon
the commerce clause for the assertion of federal dominion over naviga-
ble airspace. In United States v. California, the Tidelands case 7 7 the
Supreme Court determined that the federal government has paramount
rights in and power over the marginal ocean belt and the underlying
land adjoining the California coast. The court found no substantial
support in history for the view that the thirteen original colonies
separately acquired ownership of the ocean's bottom within the mar-
ginal belt; it attached no conclusive importance to the facts that the
Federal Government did not seriously assert its increasingly greater
rights in this area until after the formation of the Constitution and
that at the time this country won its independence there was no settled
international custom or understanding among nations that each nation
owned a three-mile water belt along its borders. Only after the United
States became a nation did it become interested in establishing national
dominion over a definite marginal zone for reasons of international
relationships-the protection of international commerce, national de-
fense and the preservation of natural resources-and California, ad-
mitted into the union on an equal footing with the thirteen original
colonies, could not possibly have acquired such national prerogatives.
The state is not equipped in our constitutional system with the
powers or the facilities for exercising the responsibilities which
would be concomitant with the dominion which it seeks. Conceding
that the state has been authorized to exercise local police power
functions in the part of the marginal belt within its declared
75 See Cooper, op. cit. supra n. 70; Cooper, Roman Law and the Maxim "Cujus
Est Solum" in International Air Law, 1 McGill L. J. 23 (1952-55); Bouve, The
Development of International Rules of Conduct in Air Navigation, 1 Air L. Rev. 1(1930); Bouve, State Sovereignty or National Sovereignty Over Navigable Air-
space, 3 J.D.C. Bar Ass'n No. 3, P. 5 (1936).
76 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
77 United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
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boundaries, these do not detract from the Federal Government's
paramount rights in and power over this area.... 78
Read in context these decisions go far in undermining the concept of
state sovereignty in air space if they do not destroy it altogether. This
idea is further strengthened by the fact that Tidelands cites Causby as
authority with the entire structure based on the Curtiss-Wright Case
where Mr. Justice Sutherland expressed the Supreme Court's views on
a phase of American history:
It will contribute to the elucidation of the question if we first
consider the differences between the powers of the federal govern-
ment in respect of foreign or external affairs and those in respect
of domestic or internal affairs .....
The two classes of powers are different, both in respect of their
origin and their nature. The broad statement that the federal
government can exercise no powers except those specifically enu-
merated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as are neces-
sary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is
categorically true only in respect of our internal affairs. In that
field, the primary purpose of the Constitution was to carve from
the general mass of legislative powers then possessed by the states
such portions as it was thought desirable to vest in the federal
government, leaving those not included in the enumeration still in
the states .... That this doctrine applies only to powers which the
states had, is self evident. And since the states severally never
possessed international powers, such powers could not have been
carved from the mass of state powers but obviously were trans-
mitted to the United States from some other source. During the
colonial period, those powers were possessed exclusively by and
were entirely under the control of the Crown. By the Declaration
of Independence, "the Representatives of the United States of
America" declared the United [not the several] Colonies to be free
and independent states, and as such to have "full Power to levy
War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce and
to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of
right do."
As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the colonies
acting as a unit, the powers of external sovereignty passed from the
Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in their
collective and corporate capacity as the United States of America.
79
Some authorities in the field believe that this brings the Supreme
Court to the brink of the conclusion that navigable airspace has the
qualities of property; that its final and obvious step will be to apply
the Tidelands test to assert that sovereignty in the navigable airspace
never was vested in the original colonies nor in the states but that it
was acquired long after the adoption of the Constitution by the Federal
Government as exclusive Federal "territory" needed for national pur-
poses; that even if some vestige of state sovereignty in navigable airspace
remains, the government has such paramount power therein as to make
78 332 U.S. at 35-36. Congress has, however, ceded title in the tidelands back
to the states. Submerged Lands Act, 67 Stat. 29 (1953), 43 U.S.C.A. § 1301-1343(Supp. 1956).
79 United States v. Curtiss Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-316 (1936).
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state sovereignty of no practical importance.80 Such a circumstance as
here envisaged would raise some perplexing problems:
Would the nationalization of navigable airspace find a vacuum in
the federal law for the definition and punishment of crimes committed
aloft or raise a barrier to the pursuit by the local police of a fugitive
fleeing by air?8'
In August, 1948 Diego Cordova assaulted the crew of an air trans-
port while traveling over the high seas. In due course Cordova was
tried and found guilty, nevertheless the federal district judge arrested
judgment because he found no federal statute which covered crimes
committed on board American aircraft over the high seas.82 This
defect has since been remedied by extending the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States, which asserts federal
criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed upon the high seas (and
out of the jurisdiction of any particular state) also to cover offenses
committed in flight over the high seas.8 3 Hence, as Congress and the
Supreme C*ourt move toward greater federal control of airspace, a
similar statute asserting jurisdiction over crimes committed in aircraft
navigating above the several states becomes necessary. Until that time,
the Cordova ruling will raise some doubt as to whether any crime
committed in any airspace found to be federal "territory" is punishable,
with the exception of four specific crimes against which Congress has
declared-the transportation of stolen aircraft from one state to an-
other, 4 committing larceny from an aircraft in interstate commerce, 5
stowing away aboard an aircraft8 6 (all based upon and consequently
coextensive with the commerce clause), and either wilfully destroying
or conveying false information relative to the destruction of an air-
craft.8 7
(Capt. Weibel's article will be concluded in the Summer, 1957, issue of the
JOURNAL, with sections on "Anti-Aircraft Campaigns in the New York Area," and
"Universality and Fair Play.")
80 Both Cooper and Dinu, ops. cit. supra n. 70, express this view.
81 See, e.g., Cooper, Crimes Aboard American Aircraft: Under What Juri8dic-
tion Are They Punishable? 37 A.B.A.J. 257 (1951); Knauth, Crime in the High
Air, 25 Tul. L. Rev. 46 (1951); Fenston and De Saussure, Crimes on Board Air-
craft, 1 McGill L. J. 66 (1952-55).
82 United States v. Cordova, 89 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. N.Y. 1950).
8362 Stat. 685, as amended by 66 Stat. 589, 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1952).
8462 Stat. 806 (1948), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2312-2313 (1952).
85 63 Stat. 96 (1949), 18 U.S.C. § 2117 (1952).
8662 Stat. 802 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 2199 (1952).
8770 Stat. 539, 540 (1956), 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 31-35 (Supp. 1956).
